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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Albert R. Moore appeals from his conviction for felony driving under the 
influence ("DUI"). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs 
The state charged Moore with felony DUI. (R., pp. 19-20.) Prior to trial, 
Moore submitted a motion in limine requesting a ruling on whether a prior DUI 
conviction out of North Dakota was "substantially conforming" for purposes of 
enhancing the present DUI to a felony. (R., pp. 34-37; Tr., p. 161, L. 19 - p. 173, 
L. 24.) The court denied the motion, and ruled that the North Dakota law was 
substantially conforming. (Tr., p. 173, L. 25 - p. 174, L. 2.) The case proceeded 
to trial, and a jury found Moore guilty of DUI. (R., p. 51.) 
In support of its allegation of prior convictions, the state submitted 
judgments from Idaho and North Dakota showing prior convictions. (State's 
Exhibits 3 & 4.) Moore objected to the admission of the North Dakota judgment 
and an attached warrant for a probation violation. (Tr., p. 203, Ls. 5-24.) The 
district court overruled the objection. (Tr., p. 204, L. 2 - p. 205, L. 6.) The jury 
returned a guilty verdict on having two or more convictions in the last ten years. 
(R., pp. 49-50.) 
The district court entered a judgment of conviction and Moore timely 
appealed. (R., pp. 56-61 .) 
ISSUES 
Moore states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to convict 
Mr. Moore of felony operating a vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol? 
2. Did the district court err in admitting the North Dakota 
judgment of conviction because it was not certified or 
authenticated? 
3. Did the district court err in admitting the North Dakota bench 
warrant because it was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Moore failed to show that the district court erred in concluding his 
North Dakota conviction was "substantially conforming" to Idaho's DUI laws? 
2. Has Moore failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by 
admitting State's Exhibit 4, which contained a North Dakota judgment of 
conviction and a warrant for arrest for a probation violation? 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Moore Has Failed To Show Error In The Conclusion That The North Dakota 
Conviction Was Substantially Conforminq To ldaho DUI Law 
A. Introduction 
Moore argues that his North Dakota conviction for DUI is not 
"substantially conforming" because the North Dakota DUI statute has been 
interpreted more broadly than Idaho's in relation to what constitutes' "physical 
control" of a vehicle, whether the crime can be committed on private property, 
and because a BAC test lower than what would bar prosecution in ldaho would 
not bar prosecution in North Dakota. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-14.) This argument 
fails because it employs an incorrect legal standard. Application of the correct 
legal standard - a comparison of Idaho's statute with North Dakota's -- shows 
that the statutes are substantially conforming. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"The determination of whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially 
conforming is a question of law to be determined by the court." I.C. § 18- 
8005(8). The construction and application of a statute also presents a question 
of law, over which the appellate courts exercise free review. State v. Shock, 133 
ldaho 753, 755, 992 P.2d 202, 204 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Schumacher, 131 
ldaho 484,485,959 P.2d 465,466 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. Moore's Arqument Fails Because It Is Based On An Incorrect Statement 
Of The Law 
It is a well-settled principle of statutory interpretation that the clearly 
expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect, thus leaving no occasion 
for construction where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous. State 
v. Scott, 135 ldaho 457,458-59, 19 P.3d 771, 772-73 (Ct. App. 2001). The state 
charged Moore pursuant to I.C. 18-8004, which defines the elements of DUI, 
and 18-8005(5)', which provided that a DUI is a felony if the defendant has "two 
(2) or more violations of the provisions of section 18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), ldaho 
Code, or any substantially conforming foreign criminal violation, or any 
combination thereof, within ten (10) years ...." (See R., pp. 19-20.) ldaho Code 
18-8005(812 specifically defined "a substantially conforming foreign criminal 
violation" for the purpose of I.C. § 18-8005(5) as follows: 
For the purpose of subsections (4), (5) and (7) of [section 
18-80051 and the provisions of section 18-8004C, ldaho Code, a 
substantially conforming foreign criminal violation exists when a 
person has pled guilty to or has been found guilty of a violation of 
any federal law or law of another state, or any valid county, city, or 
town ordinance of another state substantially conforming to the 
provisions of section 18-8004, ldaho Code. The determination of 
whether a foreign criminal violation is substantially conforming is a 
question of law to be determined by the court. 
I.C. § 18-8005(8) (emphasis added). 
Pursuant to the plain language of this statute, a court determining whether 
a foreign DUI conviction qualifies as "a substantially conforming foreign criminal 
violation" must compare the provisions of the foreign law the defendant pled 
' Currently I.C. 18-8005(6). 
*Currently I.C. 18-8005(10). 
guilty to or was found guilty of violating with the provisions of I.C. Cj 18-8004, 
which set forth the elements of DUI in ldaho. If the provisions of the foreign law 
"substantially conform" to the provisions of I.C. Cj 18-8004 (i.e., the elements of 
DUI in the foreign state substantially conform to the elements of DUI in ldaho), 
the foreign conviction is a "substantially conforming foreign criminal violation" as 
a matter of law. 
Review shows the provisions of the North Dakota DUI statute under which 
Moore was convicted "substantially conform" to the elements of I.C. Cj 18-8004. 
The North Dakota statute in effect at the time of Moore's DUI there provided: 
A person may not drive or be in actual physical control of 
any vehicle upon a highway or upon public or private areas to 
which the public has a right of access for vehicular use in this state 
if any of the following apply: 
a. That person has an alcohol concentration of at least 
ten one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of a 
chemical test within two hours after the driving or being in actual 
physical control of a vehicle. 
b. That person is under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor. 
(State's Exhibit 5 (N.D.C.C. Cj 39-08-01).) The ldaho Code provided: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of 
alcohol ... or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as defined 
in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of 
his blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control 
of a motor vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street 
or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public. 
I.C. § 18-8004(1)(a). 
The elements of these crimes, as defined in the statutes, are 
indistinguishable. See State v. Schmoll, 144 ldaho 800, 803, 172 P.3d 555, 558 
(Ct. App. 2007) ("The legislature expressly provided that the focus of the 
comparison should be on the elements of the statutes, and not the specific 
conduct giving rise to the prior violation.") Both have as elements that the person 
be "under the influence" of alcohol or intoxicating liquor, or that the person have a 
certain percent of alcohol in his system; that the person "drive or be in actual 
physical control" of a vehicle; and that the vehicle be on public property or private 
property open to the public. The I.C. !j 18-8005(8) analysis of whether Moore 
was determined to be guilty under the "law of another state ... substantially 
conforming to the provisions of section 18-8004, ldaho Code," leads to the 
inescapable conclusion that Moore is guilty of a felony. See Schmoll, 144 ldaho 
at 804, 172 P.3d at 559 ("These two statutes frame their prohibitions using the 
same language, requiring substantially conforming elements to be met to sustain 
a violation."). 
In trying to avoid the inescapable, Moore varies from the analysis required 
under I.C. § 18-8005(8) in two ways. First, he argues that to be substantially 
conforming, the foreign DUI statute may never encompass conduct that would 
not be made illegal in ldaho. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Second, he argues that 
the Court should review how the foreign statute has been interpreted by the 
courts of that state to determine if it is substantially conforming. (Appellant's 
brief, pp. 10-14.) These propositions were expressly or implicitly rejected in 
Schmoll. 
Schmoll urged the court to hold that his Montana felony DUI conviction 
could not enhance his ldaho DUI to a felony because his DUI in Montana, had it 
been committed in Idaho, would have only been a misdemeanor. Schmoll, 144 
ldaho at 804-05, 172 P.3d at 559-60 (rejecting Schmoll's request that the court 
"adopt California's standard and method for using a foreign conviction for 
enhancement purposes"). This standard was, however, rejected. Id. Instead, 
the wurt held that "Idaho Code section 18-8005(8) expressly provides that the 
comparison is between section 18-8004 and the foreign state statute that was 
violated." Id. at 805, 172 P.3d at 560 (emphasis added). Even assuming that 
North Dakota courts have interpreted its DUI provisions more broadly, even 
though the language is virtually identical to I.C. § 18-8004, such is irrelevant. A 
comparison of the statutes, as required by I.C. § 18-8005(8), shows them to be at 
least "substantially conforming." 
The plain language of I.C. 5 18-8005(8) requires that the North Dakota 
DUI statute and I.C. § 18-8004 be compared to determine if the two statutes are 
substantially conforming. That comparison shows that they are, because they 
have virtually identical elements expressed in the same or very similar language. 
That North Dakota courts have interpreted that same language more broadly in 
some specific instances is irrelevant, and also fails to show that the statutes are 
not substantially conforming. 
D. Moore Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Of His Prior Conviction In 
North Dakota Was Insufficient 
Moore also argues that the state had the burden of proving that his waiver 
of counsel in North Dakota was knowing and voluntary. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
15-18.) This argument is contrary to existing law. 
The state bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of the validity 
of the prior convictions. State v. Coby, 128 ldaho 90, 92, 910 P.2d 762, 764 
(1996); State v. Miller, 131 ldaho 288, 294, 955 P.2d 603, 609 (Ct. App 1997). 
When collaterally attacking an uncounseled prior conviction, "it is the defendant's 
burden to prove that he did not competently and intelligently waive his right to the 
assistance of counsel." Tovar v. Iowa, 541 U.S. 77, 92 (2004).~ Moore's claim 
that the state had the burden of proof is wrong. (Appellant's brief, pp. 16-17.) 
Because Moore had the burden of proving that his uncounseled guilty plea 
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and because he presented no 
evidence that his Sixth Amendment rights to counsel were violated, he has failed 
to show that the evidence of his felony is deficient. 
II. 
Moore Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By 
Admittinct State's Exhibit Four 
A. Introduction 
During the second part of the trial, dealing with the enhancement to a 
felony, the district court admitted State's Exhibit 4, which is a packet of three 
documents obtained from the North Dakota courts. (State's Exhibit 4; Tr., p. 162, 
L. 16 - p. 163, L. 20,; p. 171, L. 22 - p. 172, L. 11 .) Moore objected to admission 
of State's Exhibit 4, asserting that the judgment on page one had not been 
specifically certified, and that the arrest warrant for a probation violation on page 
Moore specifically cites Tovar for propositions other than the burden of proof, 
but fails to note that it is directly contrary to his argument. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
15-1 7.) 
three was irrelevant. (Tr., p. 203, Ls. 12-18.) The district court overruled the 
objections, finding the judgment admissible and admitting the third page (the 
warrant) with an instruction that it was for the limited purpose of showing a 
conviction. (Tr., p. 204, L. 2 - p. 205, L. 6.) 
On appeal Moore again argues that the judgment was not properly 
certified. (Appellant's brief, pp. 18-20.) He also argues that the warrant was 
irrelevant and unduly prejudiciaL4 (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-24.) Application of 
the relevant law to the Exhibit shows that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in finding it adequately authenticated. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been an abuse of that discretion. 
State v. Howard, 135 ldaho 727, 731-32, 24 P.3d 44, 48-49 (2001); State v. 
Zimmerman, 121 ldaho 971, 974,829 P.2d 861 (1992). Relevance of evidence, 
however, is reviewed de novo. State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 
966, 971 (1996); State v. Lamphere, 130 ldaho 630, 632, 945 P.2d 1, 3 (1997); 
State v. McDonald, 131 ldaho 367,956 P.2d 1314 (Ct. App. 1998). 
C. The District Court Did Not Err In Admittina Paqe One Of State's Exhibit 
Four, The Judament Of Conviction 
State's exhibit four consists of a judgment of conviction, a charging 
document, and a warrant for a probation violation. (State's Exhibit 4.) Only the 
second page of the exhibit, the charging document, bears a certification on it. 
(State's Exhibit 4.) The prosecutor represented that the exhibit was what he "had 
from North Dakota," that the middle page (the charging document) bore the 
certification, and that the documents all bear the same case number. (Tr., p. 
163, Ls. 2-25.) The prosecutor also represented that they had received all three 
pages "in a single envelope together." (Tr., p. 172, Ls. 5-1 1.) When the 
prosecution moved to admit the exhibit defense counsel objected on the grounds 
that "there is no state seal on the conviction itself." (Tr., p. 203, Ls. 15-16.) The 
court overruled the objection. (Tr., p. 204, Ls. 2-3.) 
On appeal Moore raises the same objection, contending that the judgment 
was not admissible because there was no certification on that document. 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 18-20.) While Moore is correct that there is no certification 
on the judgment itself, and it is therefore not self-authenticating under I.R.E. 902, 
such does not show that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting it. 
Questions of admissibilrty of evidence are questions for the court and may 
be decided on the basis of otherwise inadmissible evidence. I.R.E. 104(a). 
ldaho Rule of Evidence 901 governs the foundational requirements for 
documentary evidence and states, in relevant part: "The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is 
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is 
what its proponent claims." Illustrations (without limitation) of what the court may 
Whether the document was unduly prejudicial was not an issue raised below 
(Tr., p. 203, Ls. 10-22), and is therefore not preserved for appeal. State v. 
Cannady, 137 ldaho 67,44 P.3d 1122 (2002). 
take into consideration when making this determination include the court's 
comparison with specimens that have been authenticated, I.R.E. 901(b)(3); the 
"[alppearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics" of the evidence, I.R.E. 901(b)(4); and "[elvidence that ... a 
purported public record, report, statement, or data compilation, in any form, is 
from the public office where items of this nature are kept," I.R.E. 901(b)(8). 
The district court was entitled to make comparisons between the judgment 
and the authenticated charging document. I.R.E. 901(b)(3). The charging 
document bore a case number and name which corresponded to the case 
number and name on the judgment. The charge listed on the judgment 
corresponded to the statute number on the charging document. The court was 
also allowed to consider the appearance, contents and characteristics of the 
challenged document in determining its authenticity. I.R.E. 901(b)(3). The 
judgment has the appearance of a judgment, with all the relevant characteristics 
including the heading, a judge's purported signature, and a filing stamp. Finally, 
the court may consider the origins of the document. I.R.E. 901(b)(8). As noted 
above, the prosecutor represented that he had received all three documents 
(including the certified charging document) as part of a package from North 
Dakota. Finally, there was no evidence that the document was not a judgment of 
conviction from North Dakota. 
Given the totality of the circumstances before the trial court, it did not 
abuse its discretion in concluding that the copy of the judgment was what it 
purported to be. Moore has failed to show error in the district court's ruling. 
D. The District Court Did Not Err In Deemins The Probation Violation Warrant 
Relevant To Whether Moore Had Been Convicted Of DUI In North Dakota 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence." I.R.E. 401. Unless 
otherwise excludable by the rules of evidence, relevant evidence is admissible. 
I.R.E. 402. 
Page three of State's Exhibit 4 bears the following information on its face: 
Moore's name, date of birth and social security number; case number 18-98-K- 
03689 from the "District Court, Grand Forks County, North Dakota Northeast 
Central Judicial District; and a statement that Moore was "convicted of the 
crime(s) of DROVE OR IN ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF MN." (State's 
Exhibit 4.) Comparison with the charging document on page 2 of that same 
exhibit (the admission of which Moore does not challenge on appeal) reveals the 
following parallels: the same name, date of birth and social security number; a 
stamp bearing a number that is the same or at least very similar to the case 
number that appears on the warrant (98 K- 3689); the county and city of "G.F." 
and the same charge as listed as a conviction. (State's Exhibit 4.) 
Whether Moore was convicted in North Dakota of DUI was an issue in this 
case. The warrant explicitly states that someone with the same name, social 
security number and date of birth as the defendant was convicted of the crime of 
driving or actual physical control of a motor vehicle, a crime that is described with 
a primary element of DUI. The warrant thus has the tendency to make the fact of 
a prior conviction for DUI more probable than without this evidence. Moore has 
failed to show that the warrant was irrelevant to any issues at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Moore's conviction for 
felony DUE. 
DATED this 9th day of Septe 
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